Alert on more product reviews. National indignation was accompanied by national despondency. Politically Kashmir could no longer be solved blundsr the U. With a sure touch for survival at all costs, he sacrificed Mr.
Even if the political assumptions were valid, it would still have been prudent on our part to embark on a phased programme of modernisation of military equipment and reorientating our planning and training. We advocated her cause in the U. This was the official National Aim and the National Policy, in so far as Pakistan was concerned, in China never had any direct control over Tibet except by conquest. That is why I would do more than recommend this book. The three-dimensional view of the mountains gives one an idea of how treacherous the road must have been.
Despite odd meetings between the Indian and Chinese Premiers, no final settlement was reached. The British thereafter had a direct influence over the foreign policy of Tibet. The Air Force were short of aircraft and were living in fond hopes of getting more transport aircraft from somewhere. This website uses cookies to improve your experience while you navigate through the website.
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The Nanny by Gilly MacMillan. The India Uncut Blog. Damn you, online shopping. Law and Other Things. Subscribe To Posts Atom. Comments Atom. Some of my Posts may have been or may be published by me elsewhere. You are welcome to link to my Posts, but please do not copy or use republish my Posts without my express consent. General Thimayya submitted his resignation to Nehru.
Nehru handled the impasse like a seasoned politician, used his immense authority and his personal charm on the straightforward soldier and persuaded him. Later Nehru publicly stated that he thought that Thimayya was making an issue over trivial matters.
He also made a statement deprecating soldiers coercing the Civil Authority -which must remain supreme m a democracy. Nehru won his Pyrrhic victory but lived to regret it.
In he was compelled to replace those he had publicly defended and was forced to recall General Thimayya, after the NEFA Reverses, to lend respectability to the National Defence Council which was set up to assure the people against further military adventures. I cannot resist an aside. Here we see Mr. Nehru using the so-called Sino-Indian border crisis to subdue General Thimayya. We know that the same crisis has been used to extract taxes from a reluctant Parlia- ment.
If he sincerely believed in the existence of a real crisis why was he guilty of neglecting the defences of the nation? How is it possible to reconcile his appreciation of a Chinese threat with his subsequent statement that China was too weak and preoccupied to start a war with India?
To an Indian it is always distressing to find evidence that Mr. Nehru was a human politician. His subsequent actions are irreconcilable with his assertion that there was a Sino-Indian border crisis at the time of the Thimayya-Menon episode. General Thimayya was a seasoned, disciplined soldier who needed no lessons in elementary patriotism.
He would hardly have made an issue over trifles. Only over-riding national interests would have provoked him to the extreme step of resignation; and later withdraw the resignation in dutiful obedience to his Prime IMinister. If he was unbalanced and prone to make issues oyer trifles, Mr.
Nehru should not have appointed him Chief of the Army - the choice was entirely his an. Thimayya had always harboured misgivings about Chinese motives and intentions. China had the advantage of an early start in developing border communications. Indian border posts had to encounter tremendous natural obstacles.
It was accepted- that the Army divisions were located there to suppress the rebellious Khampas and to maintain law and order. Their presence did not signify any war preparations against India. Pettiness and selfishness are not qualities that one would wish to associate with a man of the stature of Mr. He was the most out- standing field commander in the Indian Army and was the first and only Indian to command a fighting brigade in battle in the Arakan, in World War II.
He won the British Distinguished Service Order on the battlefield. North Indian soldiers, the bulk of the Army, loved him as much as the rest. This is a rare tribute. In he commanded the Punjab Boundary Force, during the critical post-Partition days, when murder, massacre and madness were the order of the day. He was a big man in every way and when most people had lost their heads, he remained calm, scrupu- lously fair and absolutely honest in his dealings with Hindus and Muslims alike.
He did an outstanding job of this difficult and thankless assignment. He had cleared the Kashmir Valley of the enemy and was poised to free the Pakistan-held portion of Kashmir when the war was called off by Nehru, for reasons that have never been revealed. His personal qualities matched his military' talents and experience. As a commander he had a magic touch with both officers and men. This is the highest praise and tribute that can be paid to an officer, a gallant gentleman and an outstanding soldier.
He achieved international fame as a result of his work on the International Commission in Korea, in He was one of the few Indians who was nationally famous and who was a potential rival to the prima doima of the Indian stage -- Mr. He could not be brow-beaten, bullied or summarily dis- missed as Mr.
The signal has. For some years prior to becoming Chief, General Tlrimayya had smarted at the neglect of the Army. Tire Army in turn knew that he was the only General who knew what had to be done and who had the authority to put things right. I knew with what energy and enthusiasm he started trying to repair the damage done to the Army, and I saw his confidence being gradually eroded because he could make little headway against an indifferent and often hostile and ignorant Ministry of Defence, under Mr.
He retired a sad and disillusioned man, his advice regarding China ignored and the Army in the same state of unreadiness for its ordained tasks. As a disciplined officer he had accepted the advice and assurances of his Prime Minister and had withdrawn his resignation. Resignation is the last constitutional resort of a Service Chief in a democratic set-up, to focus national attention on a fundamental issue to give the Nation an opportunity to debate the points of dis- agreement between the Civil and Military authorities.
In a democracy, this is the only safeguard against incompetent, unscrupulous or ambitious politicians. He bravely bore the humiliations heaped on him by Nehru in Parliament, but he was never again the same man. It was a sad end to the most distinguished soldier India is likely to have in decades. In his last days of office he undoubtedly lost some of his personal hold on the officers and the other Services who resented the withdrawal of his resignation.
Some- thing drastic was necessary to move Government to face the realities of a conflict with China or Pakistan, and only Timmy had the necessary stature. I am firmly of the opinion that had he done so, Mr. A second resignation, with the additional disclosure of differences, would have put the pressure on Nehru.
Powerful enemies, many within the Congress Party; a hostile Press and others were waiting to destroy Menon and only General Thimayya could have given, them the excuse and the opportunity.
Nehru would have had to face the awkward dilemma of having to sack either Menon or Thimayya. Had he been forced to sack Menon under strong pressure from Parliament and the Press, he would have been a chastened man. Such a reverse would also have had a salutary effect on his own ego and would have demolished the aura of infallibility and indispensability that was built around him, in spite of the democratic system that was given to us in the Constitution.
Nehru also came out of this unsavoury episode the unquestioned master, and now there was no one in the Army to oppose his wrong military polity vis-a-vis China. He now received advice only from Mr. A game of chess with posts instead of pawns! Government did not offer him a Governorship or Ambassadorship, when lesser generals were rewarded with such high positions.
Employment after retirement General K. I have not read of one instance where an Ambassadorial appointment was questioned by the Press. Force in Cyprus where he died in December , in the saddle. During the years there were serious shortcomings in our National Policy.
We gave the impression of not knowing what we wanted, appeared confused and wavered between the implacable will to fight and a desire to appease the Chinese. We relied on untenable diplomatic assurances to ward off the Pakistan and Chinese threats.
We did not initiate diplomatic measures to ensure that we were not isolated in a war with either Pakistan or China. We accepted a situation where we would be per- petually in a state of armed readiness, a suicidal policy for a developing country. We allowed ourselves to be lulled into complacency by the outward manifestations of friendship with China. When the Chinese threat became unmistakable, we had no ready answer.
To sum up, we did not plan for war nor did we have diplomatic ties which would ensure timely aid in the event of war. We frittered away a large portion of our meagre resources without ensuring our security.
In , India lacked a firm, unequivocal policy, had no declared friends to assist her against China and no military power to challenge China. Major-General B. Kaul was promoted Lt. It was widely believed at the time that this was done by Mr. Welles Hangen suggests that Mr. Menon chose Kaul because he Menon felt that Kaul was far to the Left of the other conservative generals in Delhi. Whatever the reasons, the Menon- Kaul era began and these two began to have an in- creasingly decisive voice in policy matters.
The harmony and cohesion of Army HQ were inevitably affected due to the barely concealed antagonism between the Chief and one of his Principal Staff Officers, especially as it was believed that Kaul had the backing of Menon and had access to the Prime Minister.
Tliis was a dangerous development, as Army HQ, had to speak with one voice In the crucial years tfratTay ahead. I left with some misgivings about the future and wondered what was in store for us. The negligence and damage of the years could not easily be repaired. The final prod may well have been provided by the Karam Singh episode of October The Chinese incidents of August and October were beautifully timed.
There was some discord and heart-burning in the relations between the Ministry of Defence and Army HQ, as a result of the Menon- Thimayya clash; the weather in the Himalayas would soon close and we would have little time to move, quarter troops and organise proper administrative arrangements.
There was bound to be more than a little dissatisfaction among the troops deployed and. This did happen and the operation started with a lot of heart-burn- ing and mutual recrimination. The Indian jawan does not understand high politics and he blames his officers if things appear to be senseless, pointless and wrong.
Having provoked us and baited us into an un- planned and hasty action, the Chinese retreated to the warmth and comparative comfort of their winter quarters — generally requisitioned monasteries. On our side troops suffered unspeakable hardships in their first winter, without achieving any worthwhile object. We learnt one more wrong lesson, viz. This Division was organised, equipped and trained for war- fare in the plains -i. Its transport and artillery were unsuitable for mountain warfare.
In fact much heavy equipment was left behind in the foothills and useful man-power was wasted in main- taining this impedimenta. The officers and men were not acclimatised for high altitudes.
As usual, compelling political pressure forced the deployment of the wrong troops, at the wrong place and at the wrong time. The actual move was a compulsive reaction to events. The battalion was stationed in the beautiful hill cantonment of Dagshai. Before the officers had embussed a despatch rider from Brigade HQ, arrived with an important message for the Officiating Commanding Officer. This officer did not disclose the contents of the message till the officers returned from 2 Jats, late at night.
He then informed everyone that 4 Division, less a few units, had been ordered to move to NEFA in the next fortnight. The rest of the Brigade concentrated in the following week.
The snows had set in and any further advance into the heights of NEFA was ruled out in the prevailing conditions.
To keep the troops occupied a jungle training camp was established at the Foothills camp, about 14 miles from Misamari. There were no roads and no laterals; access to each sector being from the Brahmaputra Valley. There were no shelters for the troops and no animal transport.
This precipitate deployment was of no military value, especially as incidents were unlikely in the winter.
However there was complete satisfaction in Delhi where maps of NEFA sprouted in the offices of the big Brass, with little pins showing our defence preparations. A little blue pin-head- can be very satisfying and re- assuring in Delhi. Politicians can get up in the Lok Sabha and assert that Government had initiated military counter-measures to prevent any further incursions by the Chinese.
The deployment and quantum of troops were dictated solely and entirely by the administrative capacity, which was in turn dependent on the available air-lift and supply dropping equipment. There was no question of deploying units or formations to fulfil any assessed task. The induction of the maximum numbers that could be maintained became the end and not the means for implementing operational plans. If we had any National Policy and National Aim we would have appreciated the futility of sending our men into the wilderness of NEFA, without a purpose and without a military task.
The move of the Brigade was not co-ordinated with the civil authorities, i. The move of the Army appeared to be an ad-hoc decision and not as the result of the deliberations of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet.
One responsible civil official is reported to have said, in January I, that Government was considering the withdrawal of the Army. This attitude prevailed for a long time and was displayed whenever the Army approached the Civil Authority for help in the way of accommo- dation, porters, ponies and so on. They showed apathy and indifference if not actual hostility. In January , one company of the Gorkhas was sent to establish a camp at Bomdilla. In February a second company was ordered to move to Towang and establish a base.
After undergoing incredible hardships they reached in March. At this time one battalion was located in Dirang and one at Tenga. The Brigade HQ, was at Bomdilla. In one company was sent to Pankentang on the Bumla- Towang axis, and one company to Shakti on the Khenzem ane-T ow ang route. In the initial stages the Regular Army was driven to scrounge some life-saving shelters from the Assam Rifles and the Administration - a ridiculous state of affairs.
The first Gorkha company to reach Towang was lucky to be given one hutment and the Inspection Bungalow. Other administrative arrangements were equally unsatisfactory.
There was an amusing story circulating in the Army in those days. A Lieut. This caused some consternation in the rear. The quotation is obviously not verbatim. One of the main problems faced by the Army was the selection of sites for b uildin g accommodation for the troops. The Civilians were averse to the location of the Army in Towang proper, although it was the only suitable place both tactically and for receiving air-drops on which the garrison relied for survival.
There were the usual conferences to settle this vexed question. At these meetings the Civil would spell out their grandiose plans for developing Towang into a health and holiday resort and brought blue-prints indicating the future location of colleges, parks and housing projects.
The Army was invited to find some other place away from Towang and Pankentang, at 14, feet, was magnani- mously offered to the soldiers. Eventually the matter was settled by some strong-arm tactics by the Commander, Brigadier Ranbir Singh, a tough, blunt Rajput. He then sited the other elements of die Brigade and allotted unit lines without further ado.
Thorat, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Command wrote an appreciation of the military situation facing us in NEFA, bringing out lucidly and thoroughly the terrain, communications, routes, vital ground and adminis- tration. He then enunciated the correct strategy to be employed in defending NEFA. I heard that this paper was seen by Mr. Chavan when he took over in November and he was aghast that we had ignored the advice of this capable General. From the outset General Thorat appreciated that the operative principle was the need to advance from secure bases.
He correctly appreciated that the key to the defence of the Assam plains was around Bomdilla. He had also anticipated the only three routes that the Chinese used in The Chinese spent two months in Kameng after their victory in and would undoubtedly have made copious notes of this fact! Everyone agreed that any forward move should be undertaken only after consolidating Bomdilla. To put it simply, it was necessary to move from firm base to firm base, and not backward from the political boundaries of the country.
Political and military boundaries seldom coincide. The McMahon Line cannot be defended by sitting on it. This se'ft-evident Tact cannot be altered by Parliamentary baiting or pressure of public opinion. Once Government decided to employ the Army to a possible war with China then the only aim should have been the destruction of the intruding Chinese.
The strategic deployment and dispositions of regular troops is dictated solely by the ground and administrative factors. This is even more applicable where the enemy has the political and strategic initiative, as in the case of the Chinese.
As we have seen, General Thorat initially deployed only one infantry company in Towang, leaving the rest of the battalion in Bomdilla; and the Brigade further back. In the context of the border problem with China it may be necessary to set up check-posts, border-posts or flag-posts to establish our claims by physical posses- sion, and to provide day-to-day protection to the civil administration.
They must not, however be treated as defended zones or tactical positions, to be defended to the last man and last round. Government was dominated by the belief that a war with China was unlikely; and were pressed by the political necessity of appearing to defend the entire McMahon Line.
In an interview with Mr. This statement clearly indicates that Menon had imbibed the advice of his military experts. The justifiable dissatis- faction of a few alert Opposition members cannot be used as an excuse for rashness in a moment of crisis.
Then why did he not educate his Opposition colleagues? The second pertinent point is why was public opinion not educated to appreciate the realities of the confrontation with China? And lasdy were our leaders not to blame for making reassuring statements about our defence preparedness?
My own reading is that the public have ieamt a lesson and the present Government has conducted its affairs with commendable courage and restraint. The reader will recall our dignified and calm reaction to the Chinese threats in the middle of the Indo-Pak War. The last and most notable example was the conduct of the major battle at Nathu La Pass in September After exchanging blow for blow we offered a cease-fire as evidence of our strength and restraint.
The Indian public, having faith in their present leadership, was content to leave the matter to Government and made no attempt to hustle the issue. Public opinion is an unsatisfactory reason for abandoning the basic canons of war. Parliament and the public could then be told that our borders were being adequately guarded.
Our politicians had not studied military history, nor did they have the humility to listen to tne advice of capable generals who had. Indian politicians are the only ones in the world who have had no experience of war.
This applies equally to the nabobs of the Ministries of External Affairs and Defence. In difficult terrain, be it mountain, jungle or snow-covered steppe, it is sometimes militarily un- avoidable to trade space for time. This is a stark military fact. Military history affords many examples to prove this. In war the primary aim is the destruction of enemy forces. It is not the holding of impossible ground for political reasons or the undertaking of operations to appease an aroused public opinion.
Both in , when Napoleon invaded Russia and in when Hitler launched an invasion, the Russians drew the advancing armies deep into Russian territory. His better killing ground a?
The Here t. On the Indian side the precipitation is great. The mountains are covered in dense forest and thick snow in winter. Land communi- cations with the area from India are exceptionally difficult.
On the Tibetan side, the high plateau, over which the Chinese have built approach roads and airfields is extremely cold but snowfall is light. The military problem is not the relative size of the Indian or Chinese armies but how many troops each side can maintain in the frontier areas.
Brigadier Thompson might well have added the difficulty of finding dropping zones for parachute drops, which were few and far between and very rarely within convenient distance of fonvard troops. Operations are often dictated by the availability of dropping zones. A delaying action through Towang and Sela Pass, instead of offering pitched battles on unequal terms, might have delayed the Chinese. Our own build-up.
It was suicidal to fight them at a place winch was three hours from a 7-ton roadhead, while our 3-ton roadhead at Misamari was 21 days and the 1-ton roadhead at Towang 6 days away.
We relied on air transport, but the scattered drops were of no use to the forward garrisons, apart from the dropping zones being 1 to 3 days carry from the front- line troops.
To complete this discourse on the strategic con- siderations applicable to NEFA, let us review the basic advantages enjoyed by the Chinese. Tibet was a sanctuary, as India could not attack Chinese bases there without going to war. Their bases at Le, Marmang and Tsona enjoyed immunity from both ground and air attack and did not need to be guarded, thus freeing combat troops for their offensive.
If they could have been forced to set up forward bases inside NEfA, these would have been vulnerable and would have diverted troops. Every additional mouth to feed becomes a liability in the mountains. Since we decided to sit on the border i. Chou-en Lai made it clear that he woui not respect the McMahon Line.
The public and our higher planners must leai these military facts of life. There is no point getting hysterical and demanding immediate reprisa' every time the Chinese intrude into our territory, takes time and military skill to create the necessa favourable conditions for mounting an offensive, evict intruders. They were adamant. They advised against establishing any further forward posts without adequate military arrangements.
It was only after they left that we adopted the ill-fated Forward Policy and gave the Chinese an excuse for the clash of , and the subsequent lightning thrust to the plains. Having faced stiff opposition from the older and more sober generals, Government now looked for some other general who would collaborate with their forward policy. Here I would quote Mr. Since qualities of heart and head ceased to be a passport to promotion for military officers.
Harassed policymakers would have jumped at it. They would have calculated. Even after six years it is not clear as to who was actually responsible for devising this policy and whether the policy itself was the sole reason for the military riposte from China.
It therefore warrants a detailed study of the available information. General Kaul attributes the decision to Mr. According to him, Mr. Nehru is reported to have held a meeting in the autumn of in his room, at which Mr.
Mcnon, General Thapar and General Kaul were present. Studying a map showing recent Cliinese incursions, Mr. Nehru is reported to have said that whoever succeeded in establishing a post would establish a claim to that territory, as possession was nine- tenths of the law. If we inducted more posts in retaliation, we would not be able to maintain them logistically. Presumably this military advice was given by Thapar and Kaul. After some discussion Mr. Nehru is alleged to have evolved a new policy for our border areas.
Briefly the new policy was that, as China was unlikely to wage war with India, there was no reason why we should not play a game of chess and a battle of wits with them and maintain a few of our posts in what we were convinced was our territory.
If the Chinese advanced in one place, we should advance in another. Nehru is reported to have been of the view that this defensive step on our part might irritate the Chinese but no more. It would be unfair to Mr. Nehru to suggest that, he embarked on such a course without tacit military approval from some general. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet does not appear to have had a hand in this decision.
Welles Hangen, in his book After Nehru , Who? Most Army officers will agree with Messrs. Bhar- gava and Hangen. In , it was generally believed that Kaul was the man largely responsible for getting the Army committed to the northern borders before the required means were made available. Kaul himself confesses the truth about his part in forcing the Forward Policy on a reluctant Army. I told them why it was important for us to establish posts all along our border and that failure on our part to do so would result in the Chinese establishing these posts instead.
In view of the extreme shortage of man-power, labour, supply- dropping equipment and the inaccessibility of certain areas, many of which were not easy to identify, and unreliable maps, Lt. The first relevant point is the propriety of the Chief of the General Staff dealing directly, on a major policy matter, with a Corps HQ. Unfortunately, this sort of impromptu order group, presided over by Kaul, had become the accepted procedure and was resorted to whenever he felt that the forward commanders were not acting with the speed and determination which he demanded.
Having claimed that the Forward Policy was the brain-child of Mr. Nehru he states that the Gauhati meeting took a major decision. The vital issue is whether a gathering of assorted officials is empowered to take decisions on matters concerning the national interests - a matter that is solely the duty and prerogative of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. In other words, he tries to absolve himself of the widely-held belief that it was Kaul himself who was the architect and prime mover of the Forward Policy.
This passage does not enlighten us as to who selected Dhola as one of the posts under the Forward Policy; a crucial matter that cannot be side-tracked by clever verbiage. Even if we accept that Mr.
Now who disobeyed this order and set up a post in a sensitive, disputed remote area and one which the Chinese had more than once refused to concede as Indian territory? Mullick and Mr. Hooja of the Intelligence Bureau, thus dragging them into the dismal picture. Have we, as a nation, learnt our lesson, yet? Our repatriation was embarrasing as the national spotlight had again been focused on the Sino-Indian Conflict.
Read this book to understand blundr perspective. Just sample the following rules of engagement a Persuade them to leave Indian territory b If Chinese do not comply, dig-in opposite to them to scare them from attempting further incursion c Fire is permitted only in self-defense and that too with minimum force These were the orders to 7th infantry brigade from the higher command to counter the heavily armed, well administered, well prepared Chinese incursion in the Namka Chu valley of Thagla region of NEFA.
We were still wrangling about procedural bimalayan, after one year of experience. Jun 10, Srinivas marked it as to-read. Even if the political assumptions were valid, it would still have been prudent on our part to embark ralvi a phased programme of modernisation of military equipment and reorientating our planning and training. Agreement was also reached on the boundary between India and Tibet, from Bhutan eastwards to Burma, which was then under the British Indian Government.
Tibet was thus never a full-fledged Chinese pro- vince. Derek Pinto who bludner the drawings from my clumsy memory sketches. Customers who viewed this item also viewed. We would still require large-scale arms aid to equip the Army to fight two potential enemies, on two completely different types of terrain, viz. Men who would otherwise have remained mute were stung to publish. With the benefit of hindsight it may be said that he left himself with only two alternatives.
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